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MIRANDA WARNINGS IN WELFARE INVESTIGATIONS
State v. Graves, 60 N.J. 441,291 A.2d 2 (1972)
Welfare officials questioned Mrs. Graves, a welfare recipient, in an
open setting at the welfare office to determine if her husband was living
with her. After receiving warnings of her fifth amendment rights,1
except for the right to remain silent, she made incriminating statements.
Mrs. Graves was convicted of obtaining welfare funds under false pre-
tenses by failing to disclose a change in living conditions. 2 The appel-
late court reversed, holding full Miranda warnings were required. The
New Jersey Supreme Court modified the decision and held: questioning
conducted in an open setting does not constitute custodial interrogation
requiring Miranda warnings as long as it is not threatening or overbear-
ing and the individual is free to leave.3
Miranda v. Arizona4 established that a suspect "in custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way"' must
be warned of his rights before a statement made during interrogation is
admissible." Custody or a deprivation of one's freedom of action in a
1. "[A person] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
2. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:111-3 (1962):
Any person who. . . by false representation as to income or other financial
resources, or by concealing or failing to disclose a material fact which it
is his duty to reveal, obtains for himself or for any other person from any
agency of the State or from any county or municipality, or any agency of
such county or municipality, financial or other assistance in any form is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
3. State v. Graves, 60 N.J. 441, 291 A.2d 2 (1972). The New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction by reading intent into the statute and finding
that the defendant lacked the intent to defraud the welfare board.
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Id. at 445.
6. Prior to Miranda, the criterion for the admissibility of statements was whether
they were voluntary in fact, a requirement of due process. To determine whether a
statement was voluntary, the Court looked to see whether pressures exerted by the police
during detention and interrogation resulted in the confession. Included in the Court's de-
cisions were cases in which the confession resulted from ignorance, or physical or
psychological pressures. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HAnv. L. Rnv.
935 (1966). The decision in Miranda was based on the fifth amendment: "No per-
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significant way must be present before a court will apply Miranda. In
Miranda the Court was concerned about the compulsory effect of ques-
tioning conducted while the defendant was in custody or was not free to
leave.7  The Court believed that the custodial atmosphere would over-
bear the defendant's will, deprive him of his freedom to choose whether
to talk, and thus compel him to incriminate himself in violation of the
fifth amendment. 8  Custody, therefore, has become a threshold stand-
ard by which to measure whether one's statement is voluntary. 9
The question of what constitutes custody, however, remains unre-
solved. Miranda and two subsequent decisions have provided only
bare outlines. In Mathis v. United States,1" the Court found Miranda
warnings necessary when the defendant was questioned while in custody
on an unrelated charge. In Orozco v. Texas," the Court required
Miranda warnings even though the defendant was questioned in his
room, since the police testified that they would not have allowed him to
leave.' 2 The Miranda opinion, however, specifically excluded on-the-
scene questioning 13 and statements freely volunteered.' 4  Generally,
son . .. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. 384 U.S. at 445.
8. Id. at 467.
9. Determination that the defendant was or was not in custody does not replace
the requirement that a confession must be voluntary. Rather, a finding that the defend-
ant was in custody creates a presumption that the statement was involuntary unless Mi-
randa warnings were given. Even if Miranda warnings are given, if the defendant is
compelled by other facts to make statements he would not freely choose to make, those
statements are not admissible. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Spevak
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
10. 391 U.S. 1 (1967).
11. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
12. The Court emphasized that the Miranda warnings were required in a custodial
situation, even if the defendant was not in actual custody, stating, "The Miranda
opinion declared that the warnings were required when the person being interrogated
was 'in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any sig-
nificant way." Id. at 327 (emphasis original).
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). Subsequent to Miranda, courts
have had to decide the limits of "general on-the-scene questioning." See, e.g., United
States v. Edwards, 444 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1971) (information obtained from defend-
ant during investigation of possible automobile theft at used car lot was obtained during
on-the-scene investigation); Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969)
(questions about defendant's destination, finances, or permission to use car asked by
deputy sheriff after defendant gave a social security card in response to request for driv-
er's license and said car belonged to employer did not exceed scope of on-the-scene
questioning); United States v. Thomas, 396 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968) (exculpatory
statements made in response to railroad police questions asked on street corner when
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courts have construed custody narrowly, limiting it to situations in which
the defendant was questioned while under arrest,'r at the stationhouse,16
or under circumstances which would make him feel he was not free to
leave.17
defendant was not restrained admissible although Miranda warnings were not given);
Sablowski v. United States, 403 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1968) (information that two men
in military fatigues had attempted to sell a car at a curio shop sufficient to satisfy an
officer's stopping the car and requesting the car's registration and the driver's license);
Jennings v. United States, 391 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 868 (1968)
(information obtained from defendant who initiates conversation with police officer
while officer is looking at vehicle suspected of being stolen admissible).
14. 384 U.S. at 478. Lower courts have also been required to decide under what
circumstances statements are freely volunteered. See, e.g., United States v. Powers, 444
F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1971) (defendant's incriminating statement made to jailer while
defendant was in jail is admissible because it was not made as a result of any interroga-
tion or questioning by jailer); United States v. Pellegrini, 309 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (defendant's statement that stolen merchandise was at his home was admissible
because statement was not made in response to inspector's question); Jorgensen v. Peo-
ple, 495 P.2d 1130 (Colo. 1972) (defendant's statement of "I'm the one you're
looking for" was voluntary when made to police who, suspecting him of homicide,
asked him his name).
15. Since the decision in Mathis, it is clear that when a defendant is questioned
while under arrest for any reason, Miranda warnings must be given. See Blyden v.
Hogan. 320 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); cf. United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 975 (1972); note 10 supra and accompanying
text.
16. See United States v. Pierce, 397 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1968) (defendant's state-
ments made after being detained and questioned extensively by police were not ad-
missible because defendant had not been given Miranda warnings); Dickerson v. State,
276 N.E.2d 845 (Ind. 1972) (defendant was deprived of his freedom of action when
questioned in police interrogation room by one officer about complaint against him even
though defendant knew he was not under arrest and had voluntarily gone to the po-
lice station about another matter). But see Parson v. United States, 387 F.2d 944 (10th
Cir. 1968) (defendant's incriminating response to sheriff's question asked while de-
fendant was being detained at station house for other law enforcement officials, about
a matter unrelated to the suspected offense, was admissible as a voluntary statement);
Mikulovsky v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 196 N.W.2d 748 (1972) (no custodial interro-
gation w hen defendant is extensively questioned at police station after missing persons
report has been filed, but before defendant is suspected of homicide).
17. For cases finding the defendant was in custody, see, e.g., United States v.
Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1970) (defendant was not unreasonable in believing he
was in custody when FBI agents had arrest warrant for fugitive when they entered de-
fendant's apartment, defendant knew the apartment had been staked out, agents re-
quested defendant to accompany them in search, warned him of federal harboring
statute, and questioned him persistently); People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d
515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967) (when defendant felt she had no alternative but to comply
with interrogation proceeding, defendant was deprived of her freedom of action); Myers
v. State, 3 Md. App. 534, 240 A.2d 288 (1968) (when defendant, a prime suspect, was
taken from street corner, put in police vehicle, and interrogated on the way to the
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The tendency to interpret custody narrowly has prevented the exten-
sion of Miranda to agency investigations. Although suspected of crim-
inal conduct, the subject of the investigation is not under arrest nor re-
strained during the questioning, which may occur at the defendant's
place of business,' 8 the agency office, 19 or some other public place.20
Because during questioning the subject is neither in custody nor de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way, courts have not
applied Miranda.2'
station, there was a custodial interrogation). For cases finding that the defendant was
not in custody, see, e.g., United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969) (defendant
was not focus of investigation nor in custody when questioned by FBI agents who knew
of bank robbery and that a car similar to defendant's had been near the scene); United
States v. Montez-Hernandez, 291 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Cal. 1968) (interrogation is not
custodial when an officer on each side of the car asks for immigration cards of occu-
pants, all Mexican, because of apparent nervousness); State v. Bode, 108 N.J. Super.
363, 261 A.2d 396 (1970) (where police chief called on-duty officer aside for private
discussion about alleged theft by officer, and officer resumed duties and was not ar-
rested, statements were not made in custody); People v. Rodney P. (anonymous), 21
N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967) (Miranda warnings not required
where defendant responded to police questions while defendant was in his yard after
police asked friends to leave and had not arrested or restrained defendant).
18. United States v. Webb, 398 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1968) (at defendant's office by
interstate commerce commission agents); White v. United States, 395 F.2d 170 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 844 (1968) (at private club, which defendant owned
and operated, by IRS agents); SEC v. Dott, 302 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (at
defendant's office where he worked by IRS agents); United States v. Morton Pro-
vision Co., 294 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del. 1968) (at defendant's place of business by
department of agriculture agents); United States v. Roth, 285 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (at defendant's office by postal inspectors); Ouletta v. Arkansas, 246 Ark. 1130,
442 S.W.2d 216 (1969) (at bank where defendant worked by bank examiners).
19. United States v. Hamlin, 432 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1970) (postal inspector's of-
fice); United States v. Kroll, 402 F.2d 221 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1043
(1969) (armed services induction center); United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936 (1968) (armed services induction center); United
States v. Shermeister, 286 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 425
F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1970) (armed services induction center).
20. See, e.g., White v. United States, 395 F.2d 170 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 844 (1968) (private club); United States v. Messina, 388 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1026 (1968) (public restaurant).
21. See notes 18-20 supra. For arguments that Miranda should be extended to
agency investigations, see, Duke, Prosecution for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A
Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1 (1966); Elsen, Securities
Law Investigation, 2 Rnv. SEc. REG. 873 (1969); Lyton, Constitutional Rights in Crim-
inal Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D. 323 (1968); Note, Extending Miranda to Adminis-
trative Investigations, 56 VA. L. Rav. 690 (1970).
Courts usually do not apply Miranda to Internal Revenue Service investigations.
Under IRS procedures, Audit Division agents, called Revenue Agents, investigate possi-
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The New Jersey Supreme Court, after considering the conditions sur-
rounding the interview, found the defendant was neither in custody nor
ble civil liability. If they find evidence sufficient to warrant further investigation
with possible criminal charges, they refer the case to Special Agents of the Intelli-
gence Division. After receiving information, either through the Audit Division, inde-
pendent investigation, other governmental agencies, or the public, the Special Agents seek
more information through interviews with the informant, inquiries into banks and
business contacts, and discussions with governmental agencies. Most investigations
(94 percent) end here. If the investigation continues, agents contact the taxpayer,
attempt to inspect his records, and interview third parties. In the 2.5 percent of the in-
vestigations which continue beyond this point, agents conduct a full-scale investiga-
tion to collect detailed evidence of fraud. The resulting report and recommendations
filter through various commissioners and counsel to the Justice Department for prose-
cution. Only about .5 percent of the cases originally audited go to trial. See Note, The
Miranda Warnings and Tax Fraud Investigation, 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 596 (1970).
These procedures create a unique situation in which a taxpayer, out of ignorance
or a sense of duty, feels compelled to cooperate with the IRS. IRS investigations may
change from civil to criminal without the taxpayer's knowledge. The desire to coop-
erate is probably greater in IRS investigations because, unlike other agency investiga-
tions, the defendant may not realize the government's regulatory powers and the con-
sequences which follow from violations. Many taxpayers believe that the government
will only assess a deficiency if they cooperate. Furthermore, taxpayers fear an investi-
gation because it may result in notice to creditors, business associates, or
friends. Finally, tax investigations lack the built-in warnings of being questioned by
police or FBI agents, or being shown a badge or other symbol. These factors combine
to create a situation in which the taxpayer may not intelligently exercise his rights.
See Duke, supra; Lipton, supra; Note, The Miranda Warnings and Tax Fraud In-
vestigations, 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 596 (1970); Note, Extending Miranda to Administra-
tive Investigations, 56 VA. L. REv. 690 (1970). Yet, because the questioning oc-
curs in an open setting, information obtained from the taxpayer without benefit of
Miranda warnings is admissible. See, e.g., United States v. Ponder, 444 F.2d 816
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Marcus v. United States, 422 F.2d
752 (5th Cir. 1970); Cohen v. United States, 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 943 (1969); United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1968); United
States v. Bagdasian, 398 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1968). A few courts, however, have
found the requisite custody in IRS investigations and have applied Miranda. United
States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969) (physical conditions under which
the questioning was conducted so resembled custody that Miranda warnings were re-
quired); United States v. Lackey, 413 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1969) (psychological pressures
which the questioning created necessitated giving of Miranda warnings); United States
v. Gower, 271 F. Supp. 655 (M.D. Pa. 1967) (Miranda warnings required because
defendant was ignorant of his rights).
This controversy is somewhat moot because the IRS now requires its agents in
effect to give Miranda warnings. The IRS announcement states that the "taxpayer
in a criminal non-custody investigation will be advised of his constitutional rights in the
following manner. At the initial meeting, a special agent is now required to identify
himself, describe his functions, and advise the taxpayer that anything he says may be
used against him, that he cannot be compelled to incriminate himself by answering
questions or producing documents, and that he has the right to seek the assistance of
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deprived of her freedom of action in any significant way. 22 In reaching
its decision, the court concentrated on the physical aspects of custody
or freedom of action. It dismissed as unencompassed by Miranda the
compulsion generated by the investigation itself. Although it was arg-
ued that Mrs. Graves was under compulsion to cooperate because of a
state regulation which deprived a welfare recipient of benefits if she
failed to cooperate,23 the court found that no compulsion existed be-
cause she was unaware of the regulation. The court decided that neither
the expressed standard, nor the underlying concern, for the applica-
tion of Miranda was present.
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court has followed the decisions
of most courts by refusing to find that Miranda warnings were required
by the circumstances surrounding the defendant's interview, it did not
deny that Miranda warnings could be required in a welfare investigation.
In dictum, it stated that if the circumstances of the investigation would
lead a reasonable person to believe he was not free to leave, it may well
be that Miranda should apply. ' 24  Unlike most decisions in this area,
New Jersey has left open the possibility of applying Miranda to welfare
investigation. 25
any attorney before responding." IRS News Release IR-949 (Nov. 26, 1968), 7
CCH 1968 STAND. FED. TAx REP. f 6946.
22. The court emphasized that while there are certain pressures inherent in any in-
terview, the presence of only two officials, the open setting of the questioning and
the fact that she could leave at any time did not create a custodial situation re-
quiring the application of Miranda. State v. Graves, 60 N.J. 441, 443, 291 A.2d 2, 6
(1972).
23. NEw JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE MANUAL OF ADMINISTRATION 2123.2:
General Policy:
The client must understand, however, that it is the CWB [county welfare
board] which is responsible for determining whether he is or is not eligible.
If he is unwilling to have the necessary inquiries made and is unable or
unwilling to secure the required information from such sources himself, then
it shall be explained to him that the CWB will be unable to make an affirma-
tive determination. In this situation, unless he wishes to withdraw his appli-
cation he must expect that it will be denied by the CWB.
The regulation is quoted in Green v. Department of Institutions and Agencies, 109 N.J.
Super. 462, 263 A.2d 796 (App. Div. 1970), a case in which the court upheld the
county welfare board's termination of the appellant's benefits because she refused to
provide the board with the required information.
24. State v. Graves, 60 N.J. 441, 291 A.2d 2 (1972).
25. It is unlikely, however, that Miranda warnings will be required in welfare in-
vestigations. A recent United States Supreme Court decision held that a mandatory
home visit by a welfare case worker did not violate the recipient's right against unrea-
sonable searches. The Court in part based its decision on the fact that a welfare recip-
ient need not submit to the home visit, and if he does not, the termination of benefits
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is a consequence produced by his own actions and has no constitutional implications.
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324 (1971). Similarly here, the recipient can refuse
to answer questions, but if she does, the detriment which may follow is of her own
making. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in dictum to Harris v. New York, stated that
it was unwilling to extend Miranda requirements beyond "statements of an accused
made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel." 401 U.S.
222, 224 (1971).
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